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EASING THE SPRING: STRICT SCRUTINY AND
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AFTER THE REDISTRICTING CASES
2001 CutlerLecture
PAMELA S. KARLAN*
Strict scrutiny's rationale and its results stand in sharp tension
with one another. The reason for skepticism about the government's
use of race lies in our historical experience of the enslavement,
exclusion, and unfair treatment of African-Americans, AsianAmericans, and Hispanics. But strict scrutiny was the consequence,
not the cause, of the Supreme Court's decisions outlawing that
1
discrimination. It wasn't until 1964, in McLaughlin v. Florida,
that the Court "both articulated and applied a more rigorous
review standard to racial classifications."2 By then, the Court had
essentially finished the job of eradicating explicit, racial classifications, and rational basis review had proven adequate for the
task. For example, in Anderson v. Martin,3 decided the same Term
as McLaughlin, the Court unanimously struck down a Louisiana
law requiring that a candidate's race be indicated on the ballot. In
the context of early 1960s Louisiana,4 the law's most foreseeable
effect was to furnish "a vehicle by which racial prejudice may be so
aroused as to operate against one group because of race and for
* Kenneth and Harle Montgomery Professor of Public Interest Law, Stanford Law School.
As with all my work in voting rights, many of the ideas in this piece come from innumerable
conversations with Jim Blacksher, Sam Issacharoff, and Rick Pildes. In some important
ways, this piece is a bookend to an earlier article, Pamela S. Karlan & Daryl J. Levinson,
Why Voting Is Different, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1201 (1996), and I thank my co-author Daryl
Levinson for helping me to start thinking about the relationship between voting rights law
and general equal protection doctrine. Finally, thanks to Viola Canales for comments on
earlier drafts.

1. 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
2. Michael Klarman, An InterpretiveHistoryof Modern EqualProtection, 90 MICH. L.
REV. 213,255 (1991).
3. 375 U.S. 399 (1964).
4. See Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145, 148-53 (1965) (discussing Louisiana's
multifarious efforts to reduce black political power).
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another,"5 that is, to reinforce racial bloc voting. In light of its
conclusions about the law's racially discriminatory impact-and its
suspicions about the legislature's discriminatory purpose--the
Court saw no way in which the provision was "reasonablydesigned
to meet legitimate governmental interests in informing the
electorate as to candidates."7
As for the results of strict scrutiny, its late arrival has had an
ironic consequence. Strict scrutiny has been rather useless to the
groups whose mistreatment prompted its adoption.
On the one hand, strict scrutiny is generally superfluous to the
kind of equal protection case minorities have brought in the strict
scrutiny era. These cases usually involve challenges to facially
neutral laws. In such cases, to trigger strict scrutiny, plaintiffs
must first prove that the government "selected or reaffirmed a
particular course of action at least in part 'because of,' not merely
'in spite of,' its adverse effects upon an identifiable group."' But "if
the constitutional conception of 'equal protection of the laws' means
anything, it must at the very least mean that a bare ... desire to
harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate,"
let alone a compelling, "governmental interest."9 Thus, proof of an
invidious motive by itself strips a law of its presumptive legitimacy.
As a formal matter, once the plaintiff has shown a discriminatory
purpose, the burden shifts to the defendants to prove that the law
would have been enacted even without that purpose." As a
practical matter, though, proof of an invidious intent to injure

5. Anderson, 375 U.S. at 402.
6. Id. at 403 (describing how the challenged provision was added to the law in 1960 and
stating that "[t]his addition to the statute in the light of 'private attitudes and pressures'
towards Negroes at the time of its enactment could only result in that 'repressive effect'
which 'was brought to bear only after the exercise of governmental power") (quoting Bates
v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960)).
7. Id. (emphasis added).
8. Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979).
9. U.S. Dept. of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973).
10. Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 228 (1985).
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blacks or Hispanics is the ballgame." Few courts, having found that
sort of malevolence, are likely to uphold a law anyway. 2
On the other hand, strict scrutiny has proved invaluable in the
assault on race-conscious affirmative action. That is certainlywhere
the Court usually deploys it. 3 Of course, it can be hard to separate
ajustice's view on the appropriate standard ofreview from her view
on the underlying merits: Is skepticism about affirmative action the
cause or the consequence of applying strict scrutiny to all racial
classifications? Still, it seems pretty clear that the level of scrutiny
the Court applies to race-conscious affirmative action is closely
correlated with the outcome it reaches. It is not simply coincidence
that the Court upheld the affirmative action programs in Metro
Broadcasting'4 and Fullilove,5 where it applied a more lenient test
that asked whether the challenged measures were substantially
related to the achievement of an important government objective,
but that it expressed serious doubts about the set-aside program at
issue in Adarand Constructors,Inc. v. Pena," where it squarely
held that "all racial classifications, imposed by whatever federal,
state, or local governmental actor, must be analyzed by a reviewing
court under strict scrutiny."' 7
11. I can think of only one (perhaps) exception, City ofRichmond v. United States, 422
U.S. 358 (1975). In City of Richmond, the district court found that the city had annexed
outlying white suburbs for the purpose of diluting black voting strength within the city. On
appeal, the Supreme Court accepted the district court's findings with respect to a
discriminatory purpose, but was "nevertheless persuaded that if verifiable reasons are now
demonstrable in support of the annexation," id. at 373-74 (emphasis added), the city could
retain the annexed areas consistent with section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. It is
unclear to me whether the Court would have reached the same conclusion in a constitutional
challenge to the annexation.
12. Cf Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228,252 (1989) (plurality opinion) (noting
that"proving'that the same decision would have been justified ... is not the same as proving
that the same decision would have been made'" even absent the discriminatory purpose,
which is the key question in a mixed-motive case).13. The only exception ofwhich I am aware is a now-ancient case, Loving v. Virginia,388
U.S. 1 (1967), which struck down Virginia's criminalization of interracial marriage. Itis hard
to believe that by 1967, rationality review would not have accomplished the same end: what
conceivable state purpose for banning interracial marriage would the Supreme Court have
found "legitimate"?
14. Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 565 (1990).
15. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 473 (1980); see also id. at 519 (Marshall, J.,
concurring).
16. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
17. Id. at 227. That program was back before the Court this Term in Adarand
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One of the striking features of the Supreme Court's docket is how
few classic affirmative action cases it has taken over the years. This
has left the lower courts with relatively little guidance. Not
surprisingly, in the years since Adarand, they have reached
contradictory results.'" My own sense is that, with a little help from
the parties, 9 the Supreme Court has been more than happy to stay
out of the fray.
The Supreme Court, however, has not been entirely absent from
the controversy over governmental uses of race. Far from it. Over
the past decade, the Supreme Court has addressed the question
repeatedly, in the context of race-conscious redistricting. ° Its
Constructors,Inc. u. Mineta, 534 U.S. 103 (2001). The Tenth Circuit found that the program,

as subsequently modified, was narrowly tailored to the achievement of the compelling
government purpose of combating private racial discrimination that had either impeded
minority business formation or had made it more difficult for minority-owned businesses to
compete for government contracts. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Slater, 228 F.3d 1147,1187
(10th Cir. 2000), cert. grantedsub nom. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Mineta, 532 U.S. 967
(2001). The Supreme Court granted certiorari limited to the questions "[w]hether the court
of appeals misapplied the strict scrutiny standard in determining if Congress had a
compelling interest to enact legislation designed to remedy the effects of racial
discrimination" and "[wihether the United States Department of Transportation's current
Disadvantaged Business Enterprise program is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling
governmental interest." Mineta, 532 U.S. at 967. After briefing and oral argument, it
dismissed the petition for certiorari as improvidently granted. Adarand Constructors, Inc.
v. Mineta, 534 U.S. 103 (2001).
18. Compare, e.g., Adarand, 228 F.3d 1147 (upholding the constitutionality of a raceconscious highway construction contracting program), with Builders Ass'n of Greater Chicago
v. Cook County, 256 F.3d 642 (7th Cir. 2001) (striking down a county ordinance requiring
that businesses owned by women and minorities be allotted certain percentages of county
construction projects as violating the Equal Protection Clause), and Hopwood v. Texas, 236
F.3d 256 (5th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 2550 (2001) (holding that a law school's
affirmative action admissions program violates the Fourteenth Amendment), with Smith v.
University of Washington, 233 F.3d 1188, 1200 n.9 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S.
1051 (2001) (asserting that a race-conscious law school admissions program that was
properly designed and executed would not violate Title VI or the Equal Protection Clause).
19. See, e.g., Matthew S. Lerner, Comment, When Diversity Leads to Adversity: The
PrinciplesofPromotingDiversity in EducationalInstitutions,Premonitionsof the Taxman
v. Board of Education Settlement, 47 BUIF. L. REV. 1035,1044-49 (1999) (discussing how civil
rights groups raised the money to settle, and thereby moot, an afflrmative action case on
which the Supreme Court had granted certiorari).
20. These cases are not easily avoided, since they involve three-judge district courts and
mandatory appellate jurisdiction at the Supreme Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2284 (2000)
(regarding cases challenging statewide legislative and congressional redistricting); 42 U.S.C.
§ 1973c (1994) (regarding all cases under section 5 of the Voting Rights Act); SAMUEL
ISSACHAROFFETAL., THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY: LEGAL STRUCTURE OFTHE POLITICAL PROCESS

905-06 (2d ed. 2001) [hereinafter THE LAw OFDEMOCRACY]; Michael E. Solimine, The Three-
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decisions, which are all over the map in both the literal and
figurative senses of the phrase, suggest a nuanced understanding
both of what triggers and of what satisfies strict scrutiny. The
redistricting cases may flesh out the Court's expressed wish in
Adarand--"to dispel the notion that strict scrutiny is 'strict in
theory, but fatal in fact.'" 21 They suggest that strict scrutiny may be
strict in theory, but rather pliable in practice.
The first part of this Article explores the evolution of strict
scrutiny in the Court's race-conscious redistricting cases. It shows
how the Court has become less trigger-happy in invoking strict
scrutiny in the first place: under the predominant purpose
standard, not every use of race renders a plan constitutionally
suspect. Moreover, the Court has recognized an important role for
the political branches' judgments about how best to safeguard
equality in its articulation of what constitutes a compelling state
interest. Having described some central aspects of the redistricting
cases, the second part of this Article turns to the question whether,
and how, the Court might translate its doctrinal innovations here
into its consideration of affirmative action in higher education. In
previous work, I have explained my skepticism about a transsubstantive approach: the use of race in the redistricting process
has seemed distinctive to me in ways that made it both "misguided
and incoherent" to use general equal protection doctrine there.22
But I lost that battle. The Court seems to have embraced the idea
that, when it comes to the government's use of race, there is one
equal protection clause. It is worth taking the Court at its word, at
least to see where that can lead us.
I. THE NOT-STRICTLY STRICT SCRUTINY OF THE REDISTRICTING

CASES
In the three decades between the Supreme Court's entrance into
the political thicket in Baker v. Carr" and its decision in Shaw v.
Judge DistrictCourt in Voting Rights Litigation, 30 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 79 (1996).
21. Adarand,515 U.S. at 237 (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 519 (1980)
(Marshall, J., concurring)).
22. Karlan & Levinson, supranote *, at 1202.

23. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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Reno,2 4 the Court developed a unique set of equal protection rules
for cases involvingredistricting.25 Some of those rules-for example,
one person, one vote-have no real counterpart elsewhere in equal
protection. Others-for example, the distinctively tolerant approach
to political gerrymandering-permit the government to take actions
in the redistricting process that would be forbidden elsewhere.
When it came to race and representation, the Court's qualitative
dilution doctrine has been explicitly group-oriented rather than
individualistic.
The one significant intersection of general equal protection
doctrine with racial vote dilution occurred in the Court's 1980
decision in City of Mobile v. Bolden,2 6 where the Court held that
Washington v. Davis2" required that minority plaintiffs prove that
the defendant jurisdiction had adopted or maintained its election
system precisely because of its dilutive impact on minority voters.
Two years later, Congress amended section 2 of the Voting Rights
Act of 1965 in order to eliminate the purpose requirement (ofcourse
as a matter of statutory, rather than constitutional law),28 and in
Thornburg v. Gingles,29 the Supreme Court adopted an expansive
construction of amended section 2 that focused on the question
whether minority voters had an equal opportunity to elect the
candidates of their choice. In areas with significant racial bloc
voting-and this includes much of the South and Southwest, as well
as some northern cities-minority voters can elect their preferred
candidates only from districts where they form a substantial share,
often a majority or supermajority, of the electorate. Thus, the
standard remedy for a section 2 violation is to create some number
of majority-black or majority-Hispanic districts.
As a result of amended section 2, when the post-1990 round of
decennial redistricting rolled around, states faced a substantial
prospect of liability if they failed to draw majority-minority districts
in areas with politically cohesive minority populations. Those
24. 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
25. For a more extensive discussion of this point, see Karlan & Levinson, supranote *,
at 1201-02, 1204-08.
26. 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
27. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
28. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1994).
29. 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
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jurisdictions required to seek federal preclearance under section 5
of the Act"0 confronted strong pressure from the Department of
Justice as well. In several states, including North Carolina and
Georgia (whose plans were to end up at the Supreme Court), the
Department rejected the states' proposals until they created more
majority-nonwhite districts.3 "
Redistricting has always been an unseemly process, nature red
in tooth and claw, but -a combination of features in the post-1990
round produced unseemly results. The Democratic politicians who
controlled redistricting within many jurisdictions with large
minority populations, particularly in the South, faced an exquisitely
difficult problem: in the face of declining support among white
voters, they needed both to preserve the seats of incumbent white
legislators and to create some new majority-minority districts.32 The
technique they used, aided by computer technology and detailed
census data that allowed far more fine-tuning of district lines than
had previously been possible, was to painstakingly divvy up
populations of black or Hispanic voters, often block by block, so as
to create new majority-minority districts while leaving sufficient
numbers of reliable minority Democrats in the adjacent majoritywhite districts held by Democratic incumbents. 3 In fact, all
gerrymandering, including purely partisan efforts, was more
surgical. Across the board, congressional district lines following the
post-1990 redistrictingwere significantly more contorted than their

30. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1994). Section 5 requires specified jurisdictions (those which have
a history of excluding minority citizens from full political participation) to get federal
approval before using a new districting plan. For a full treatment of the section 5

preclearance process, see THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY, supra note 20, at 546-671.
31. E.g., Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 902 (1996) (North Carolina); Millerv. Johnson, 515
U.S. 900, 906-07 (1995) (Georgia); Johnson v. DeGrandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1001 n.2 (1994)

(Florida).
32. See, e.g., Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, 'Bizarre
Districts,"and Voting Rights: EvaluatingElection DistrictAppearancesAfterShaw v. Reno,
92 MICH. L. REV. 483, 516-24 (1993) (noting that in the case of North Carolina, one view of
the facts in Shaw suggests that the "bizarre" election district appearance at issue was due
to a desire to protect incumbents and comply with the VRA).
33. For discussions of this phenomenon, see for example, DAVID LUBLIN, THE PARADOX
OF REPRESENTATION: RACIAL GERRYMANDERING AND MINORITY INTERESTS IN CONGRESS 98119 (1997); Pamela S. Karlan, Loss and Redemption: Voting Rights at the Turn of a Century,
50 VAND. L. REV. 291, 302-04 (1997) (citing sources).
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predecessors.3 4 The fact that many of the most irregularly shaped
districts were majority-black or majority-Hispanic was in large part
a function of political imperatives rather than pure necessity. For
the most part, minority groups got their districts drawn last, and
therefore had them squeezed into a map that had already taken
shape.35
When the Supreme Court first confronted a challenge to one of
these districts, in Shaw v. Reno,3 6 it recognized that its pre-existing
case law, which had focused on disenfranchisement and dilution,
was orthogonal to the question. The Court instead recognized a
new, "analytically distinct claim that a reapportionment plan
rationally cannot be understood as anything other than an effort to
segregate citizens into separate voting districts on the basis of race
without sufficient justification."3 7 This claim-especially as the
Court made clear that only a "compelling" justification would be
sufficient 3 -- appeared to merge the law governing race-conscious
districting back into general-purpose equal protection doctrine.
Yet, even in Shaw v. Reno, there were hints that the Court was
tweaking conventional equal protection doctrine. It modified both
what triggers strict scrutiny and what counts as a compelling state
interest in important and potentially far-ranging ways. Those
modifications have been amplified in its later decisions. The upshot
is that there is now far more room for the use of race than the
categorical statement in Adarand might suggest.

34. Pildes & Niemi, supra note 32, at 569-75 (concluding that election districts in the
1990s were less "compact" than election districts in the 1980s).
35. One telling piece of evidence: in California, where special masters appointed by the
state supreme court drew the districts, blacks and Hispanics were apparently first in line,
and their districts were relatively compact. Wilson v. Eu, 823 P.2d 545, 579-80 (Cal. 1992)
(appendix containing the report of the special masters who drew California's congressional
and legislative districts) ("Having first constructed Latino and African-American
congressional and state legislative districts,... the remainderof the districts allocated to Los
Angeles County had to be constructed around the periphery; in some instances they became
rather elongated.") (emphasis added).
36. 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
37. Id. at 652.
38. See id. at 642.
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A. What Triggers Strict Scrutiny
When it came to redistricting, for all the Court's invocations of
the ideal of colorblindness, the Court did not require plan drawers
to ignore race. The Court distinguished redistricting from other
kinds of government decision making on the grounds that "the
legislature always is aware of race when it draws district lines, just
as it is aware of age, economic status, religious and political
persuasion, and a variety of other demographic factors."39 That
awareness, however, is not inevitable: the reason politicians who
draw district lines are aware of race in a precise form is that they
have obtained race-specific data from the Census Bureau."0 It is
entirely possible to draw district lines without regard to race at
all."' The reason politicians don't do so is primarily that they find
race very helpful for purely partisan reasons-in some places race
is highly correlated with voting behavior (indeed, it can be more
highly correlated than party registration), and serves as a
shorthand way of figuring out the political complexion of a potential
district. In addition, line-drawers face pressure from the Voting
Rights Act and minority communities to provide minority voters
with some districts from which they can elect the candidates of
their choice. Without knowing the size and geographic distribution

39. Id. at 646.
40. Cf. Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 925 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting),
I do not believe that it would make sense to apply strict scrutiny to the Federal
Government's decisionto require citizens to identify their race on census forms,
even though that requirement would force citizens to classify themselves
racially, and even though such a requirement would arguably convey an
insidious message about the Governments continuing belief that race remains
relevant to the formulation of public policy.
Karlan & Levinson, supra note *, at 1214 (describing how legislators rely on race-specific
census data and suggesting that applying strict scrutiny to all government actions that
describe individuals in racial terms would mark a significant expansion of existing doctrine).
41. For aparticularlypointed example, see ROBERTH. BOETHETEMPTINGOFAMERICA:
THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 84-89 (1990). Then-professor Bork was retained by
a federal district court to redraw Connecticut's state legislative districts. Armed with a map,
a ruler, and nothing but gross population figures, he drew a plan that "utterly ignored
geographical and demographic facts," and maximized population equality, with the ironic
consequence that his plan produced praise from the Democrats and consternation among
Republicans.
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of a minority population, it is impossible to determine whether a
plan complies with the Act.
Nor is that awareness unique. Many government decision makers
are aware of race and other demographic factors when they make
their decisions. An admissions officer at the University of Michigan,
for example, is bound to know that the Detroit public school system
is over ninety percent black, and thus that an applicant who
attended high school there is quite likely to be African-American.
An admissions officer at the University of Texas who sees that an
applicant's name is "Viola Canales" and that she grew up in
McAllen, in the Rio Grande Valley, can reasonably assume that she
is Hispanic. Any decision maker who encounters an individual faceto-face will have at least some racial or ethnic information about
some applicants.4 2 It may turn out that the Supreme Court has a
somewhat naive view of the information typically available to state
actors because the affirmative action cases that produced its
embrace of strict scrutiny-Croson' and Adarand"-involved the
highly formal and thus somewhat atypical practice of competitive
bidding. In competitive bidding, anonymity is easy to achieve, and,
assuming the bid meets the specifications, bids can be ranked
against each other along one entirely quantifiable dimension,
namely, price.45
42. Of course, observations may be either indeterminate or factually incorrect. Indeed,
one of the (many) reservations police departments have about collecting racial data about
traffic stops is the problem with asking officers to assess race for themselves and the
alternative problem with officers asking the people they stop to indicate their race. Even
without access to formal data about the race of a person with whom they are dealing,
however, government officials often will have a hunch about race or ethnicity. It may be
virtually impossible, in any settingwhere the official has any degree of discretion, to be sure
that race played no role in the official's decision, because it may be impossible to erase the
official's knowledge or beliefs about race.
43. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (striking down a city's setaside program as violative of the equal protection clause).
44. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
45. As I suggest later, see infra text accompanying notes 120-27, the admissions process
at a competitive educational institution resembles redistricting far more than it resembles
competitive bidding. From among those who meet the basic qualifications (as from among
plans that comply with one person, one vote), there will be an array of possible classes, no
one of which is clearly superior along every one of a set of distinct dimensions. Very few
people argue that higher education admissions should take place exclusively along a single,
entirely quantifiable dimension. Indeed, evenwith regard to the quantifiable elements-such
as test scores or prior G.P.A.-there are often disagreements about whether and what
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More significantly, the Shaw v. Reno Court suggested that "race
consciousness does not lead inevitably to impermissible race
discrimination."4 6 The example of permissible, race-conscious action
to which Shaw v. Reno pointed was Wright v. Rockefeller,"7 a case
involving post-1960 congressional redistricting in Manhattan.
According to Shaw v. Reno, the plan at issue in Wright shows that
when members of a racial group live together in one community,
a reapportionment plan that concentrates members of the group
in one district and excludes them from others may reflect wholly
legitimate purposes. The district lines may be drawn, for
example, to provide for compact districts of contiguous territory,
or to maintain the integrity of political subdivisions.4"
To be sure, the Wright Court did affirm the district court's
determination that the plaintiffs had failed to show that the specific
boundaries "'were drawn on racial lines."49 But consider, for a
moment, the facts: on a relatively small island,5" the legislature
managed to create adjacent districts with wildly different
demographic (and, not coincidentally, political) complexions. The
Seventeenth District-the so-called "Silk Stocking" district-was
94.9% white (and the only Republican seat).5 1 The adjacent
Eighteenth District-an overwhelmingly Democratic district
centered on Harlem-was 86.3% black and Puerto Rican.5 2 And
what did these districts look like? In dissent, Justice Douglas drew
a verbal picture of the boundary between the two:
The southeast corner [of the Eighteenth District] is near the
East River and from there it goes-west four blocks, north two
blocks, west one block, north five blocks, west one block, north
one block, west one block, north one block, west one block, north
eleven blocks, west five blocks across the northern line of
adjustments are required to reflect underlying ability or potential.
46. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 646 (1993).
47. 376 U.S. 62 (1964).
48. Shaw, 509 U.S. at 646.
49. Wright, 376 U.S. at 55 (quoting the district court opinion).
50. So much for the plan having anything to do with "maintainfing] the integrity of
political subdivisions." Shaw, 509 U.S. at 646. No political subdivisions were involved.
51. Wright, 376 U.S. at 59 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
52. I&
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Central Park to Morningside, north along Morningside about
twelve blocks, west one block, north along Amsterdam from
122d to 150th, east 53two blocks, north fifteen blocks to 165th, and
east to East River.
People roughly familiar with the East Side during the 1960s were
surely aware that, as one moved westward towards Fifth Avenue
and Central Park, the informal boundary line between white
and minority neighborhoods moved north-just like the district
lines did. The eleven-sided, step-shaped boundary between the
Seventeenth and Eighteenth Districts was as surgical a dissection
as the districting techniques of 1961 made possible. But I would be
quite surprised if someone who simply looked at the demographic
information and the maps in Wright would see a constitutionally
significant distinction between the New York plan and the North
Carolina plan challenged in Shaw, or, even better-because it too
involved carving up metropolitan areas-the Texas plan at issue in
Bush v. Vera.5 4
Put another way, the plan in Wright might well reflect
"community," but that community was itself racially defined.5 5 It
was not an accident that Harlem got a district. Were it not for the
political deal cut in the state legislature-where the majorityRepublican state senate insisted on getting a Republican seat in
Manhattan and received Democratic support for the overall plan
because it also protected black incumbent Representative Adam
Clayton Powell's base in Harlem-it is entirely possible that
Harlem could have been split between two districts, each of which
would then have been majority white, and majority Democratic as
53. Id. at 60.
54. 517 U.S. 952 (1996). In Vera, the Supreme Court struck down majority-black and
majority-Hispanic congressional districts in Houston and Dallas. Id at 973-76. Those plans
were products of precisely the kind of incumbent-protecting, partisan-concerned attempt to
satisfy a host of competing considerations as the Wright plan. The only real differences were
that 1990s technology enabled the lines to be drawn a bit more finely and the parties were
a little more candid about what was going on.
55. I explore the question of what "community" means in the context of legislative
districting in Karlan & Levinson, supranote *, at 1216-20, and Pamela S. Karlan, Still Hazy
After All These Years: Voting Rights in the Post-Shaw Era, 26 CUMB. L. REV. 287, 302-05
(1995). See also Stephen J. Malone, Note, Recognizing Communities of Interest in a
LegislativeApportionmentPlan,83 VA. L. REv. 461 (1997) (extensively examining the concept
of "communities of interest").
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well.56 Race, along with politics, incumbent protection, and a host
of other factors, played some role in the creation and configuration
of the districts.
In fact, as the Shaw v. Reno Court formulated its test, it refused
to express a view "as to whether 'the intentional creation of
majority-minority districts, without more,' always gives rise to an
equal protection claim."57 Instead, it kept describing the constitutionally suspect plans as those that "rationally can be viewed only
as an effort to segregate," 8 "rationally cannot be understood as
anything other than an effort to 'segregat[e]," 9 and "created solely
to effectuate the perceived common interests of one racial group." °
Why the hedging or limitation? If general equal protection doctrine
is to apply, why doesn't the intentional reliance on race trigger
strict scrutiny automatically? After all, two years later in Adarand,
the Court announced a categorical rule: "[AZl racial classifications
...
must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny."

Is it that "racial classification" is a term of art, so that the
government can use race as long as that use does not rise to the
level of being the preeminent factor?
The Court's subsequent cases suggest the answer is "yes"--some
uses of race are insufficient to trigger strict scrutiny. That principle
62
debuted in Miller v. Johnson--a decision announced less than
three weeks after Adarand-andwas recently given real teeth in
Easley v. Cromartie.3
Miller involved a challenge to Georgia's creation of two new
majority-black congressional districts. (A third district was the
successor to a majority-black district created as a result of voting
rights litigation in the 1980s.) s" Miller purported to rely on general
56. The plaintiffs in Wright were Manhattan Democrats. Their clear aim was to force a
redrawing of the district lines between the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Districts, moving
blacks and Puerto Ricans into the former, thereby changing its partisan composition. See
Wright, 376 U.S. at 53-54.
57. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 649 (1993) (quoting dissent).
58. Id. at 642 (emphasis added).
59. Id. at 646-47 (emphasis added).
60. Id. at 648 (emphasis added). I have not bothered to cite the many other, purely
repetitive formulations of the question.
61. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (emphasis added).
62. 515 U.S. 900 (1995).

63. 532 U.S. 234 (2001).
64. For a detailed account of Georgia's redistricting history, see Pamela S. Karlan, The
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equal protection principles, but it subtly changed the focus.
Consider the critical passage:
Redistricting legislatures will, for example, almost always be
aware of racial demographics; but it does not follow that race
predominates in the redistricting process. Shaw, [509 U.S. at
6461; see PersonnelAdministratorof Mass. v. Feeney, [442 U.S.
256,279 1979)] ("Discriminatory purpose'... implies more than
intent as volition or intent as awareness of consequences. It
implies that the decisionmaker ...selected or reaffirmed a

particular course of action at least in part 'because of,' not
merely 'in spite of,' its adverse effects") (footnotes and citation
omitted). The distinction between being aware of racial
considerations and being motivated by them may be difficult to
make. ... The plaintiffs burden is to show, either through

circumstantial evidence of a district's shape and demographics
or more direct evidence going to legislative purpose, that race
was the predominant factor motivating the legislature's decision
to place a significant number of voters within or without a
particular district. To make this showing, a plaintiffmust prove
that the legislature subordinated traditional race-neutral
districting principles, including but not limited to compactness,
contiguity, and respect for political subdivisions or communities
defined by actual shared interests, to racial considerations.
Where these or other race-neutral considerations are the basis
for redistricting legislation, and are not subordinated to race, a
State can "defeat a claim that a district has been gerrymandered
on racial lines."65
I shall put to the side the Court's creative extension of
Feeney-no one has ever alleged in any of the post-Shaw cases that
the state created majority-nonwhite districts because of their
"adverse effects" on anyone. Indeed, the plaintiffs in the racial
redistricting cases have assiduously declined to raise claims of vote
dilution at all.6 6 What is more significant for our purpose is the
Court's introduction of a "predominant factor" test: only if the
FireNext Time: ReapportionmentAfterthe 2000 Census,50 STAN. L. REV. 731,745-47 (1998).
65. Miller, 515 U.S. at 916.
66. I explore this point in extensive detail elsewhere. Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S.
Karlan, Standing and Misunderstandingin Voting Rights Law, 111 HARV.L. REv. 2276,
2278-79, 2284-87 (1998).
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legislature "subordinate[s]" permissible principles to a racial end
has it acted with a discriminatory purpose.
That had not previously been the law. In Village of Arlington
Heightsv. MetropolitanHousingDevelopment Corp., the Court had
squarely refused to rest its analysis on the comparative centrality
of different motives:
Rarely can it be said that a legislature ...made a decision
motivated solely by a single concern, or even that a particular
purpose was the "dominant" or "primary" one. In fact, it is
because legislators and administrators are properly concerned
with balancing numerous competing considerations that courts
refrain from reviewing the merits of their decisions, absent a
showing of arbitrariness or irrationality. But racial
discrimination is not just another competing consideration.
When there is a proof that a discriminatory purpose has been a
motivating factor in the decision, this judicial deference is no
longer justified.6 7
Moreover, as I suggested earlier in explaining the superfluousness
of strict scrutiny to claims by racial minorities, the Arlington
Heights Court did not suggest that proof of a racially discriminatory
purpose triggered strict scrutiny. Rather,
[piroof that the decision by the Village was motivated in part by
a racially discriminatory purpose would ... have shifted to the
[defendant] the burden of establishing that the same decision
would have resulted even had the impermissible purpose not
been considered. If this were established, the complaining party
in a case of this kind no longer fairly could attribute the injury
complained of to improper consideration of a discriminatory
purpose. 8

67. 429 U.S. 252, 265-66 (1977) (citations omitted). In a footnote, the Court elaborated
by quoting its observation in McGinnis v. Rayster, 410 U.S. 263, 276-77 (1973), that: "The

search for legislative purpose is often elusive enough... without a requirement thatprimacy
be ascertained. Legislation is frequently multipurposed: the removal of even a 'subordinate'
purpose may shift altogether the consensus of legislative judgment supporting the statute."
Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 265 n.11.
68. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 270 n.21.
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Miller substitutes a strict scrutiny trigger-which will require
the government to advance a compelling purpose, rather than
simply to show that it would have taken the challenged action
anyway for some legitimate reason-but it then limits this trigger
to cases where race "subordinated" other factors, rather than also
abandoning judicial deference in cases where race was just "a"
motivating factor.
In part, this might reflect the Court's implicit recognition that
uses of race that are not intended to injure should be treated
differently even if there is no compelling justification for using race.
The Court's opinion leaves this unclear. What is clear, though, is
that the prior case law had not required proof of predominance.
The concept of predominance is, in any case, problematic when it
comes to redistricting. If "predominant" really means categorically
preferred to all other goals, then race is never the predominant
factor in any plan drawn by politicians. Three factors the Court
inexplicably left off its list of traditional districting principlescompliance with one person, one vote; partisan advantage; and
protection of incumbents-are always going to be as important.69
Moreover, the concept is further complicated by Miller's reassurance that "[a] State is free to recognize communities that have
a particular racial makeup, provided its action is directed toward
some common thread of relevant interests."70 What does this mean,
especially in light of the Court's somewhat contradictory claims that
race fails to correlate with any common thread of politically salient
interests (in the Shaw cases) and that plaintiffs must prove that the
minority community is politically cohesive (in cases under the
Voting Rights Act)?71
In each of the post-Miller cases to come before the Court on the
merits, the defendants have argued that race was not the
predominant factor in explaining the configuration of the
challenged districts. Instead, they argued that political considerations-primarily incumbent protection-played a more decisive
3 the Court rejected that
role. In Bush v. Vera7" and Shaw v. Hunt,"
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

See Karlan, supranote 55, at 302-03.
Miller, 515 U.S. at 920.
See Karlan & Levinson, supranote *, at 1216-20.
517 U.S. 952 (1996).
517 U.S. 899 (1996).
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claim, finding that the ways in which race was used belied that
protestation. 4 But last Term, in Easley v. Cromartie,5 the Court
accepted the defendant's argument.76
Cromartie involved a challenge to a redrawn version of North
Carolina's Twelfth Congressional District, the district earlier
challenged in Shaw v. Reno and Shaw v. Hunt.77 Justice Breyer's

opinion for the Court in Cromartie sharpened the distinction
between race "simply hav[ing] been 'a motivation for the drawing
of a majority minority district" 7 --which would be entirely
permissible-and race being the "predominant factor," a showing
that would trigger strict scrutiny. The Court then performed a
painstakingly thorough review of the record, going beyond the
district court's findings to examine the entire testimony of the
expert witness on which the trial court had relied. Ultimately, it
concluded that the legislature's motivation in drawing the
boundaries as it had was predominantly political, not racial, and
that the district court's conclusion to the contrary was clearly
79
erroneous.

Much of the Court's discussion focused on the difficulty of teasing
apart political and racial considerations in jurisdictions where
voting behavior is strongly correlated with race."0 For present
purposes, the most interesting part of the Court's discussion is its
treatment of one of the pieces of direct evidence relied on by the
district court. One of the leaders of the redistricting process, State
Senator Roy Cooper, testified before the legislative committee
considering the plan that:
Those of you who dealt with Redistricting before realize that you
cannot solve each problem that you encounter and everyone can
find a problem with this Plan. However, I think that overall it
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Vera, 517 U.S. at 972-73; Hunt, 517 U.S. at 906-07.
532 U.S. 234 (2001).
Id. at 246-48.
Id. at 237.
Id. at 241 (quoting Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 959 (1996)).

79. Id. at 257-58. Like virtually all of the Shaw cases decided on plenary review of the

merits (rather than summarily), the decision inHuntv.Cromartiewas 5-4. Interestingly, the
dissent, written by Justice Thomas, did not argue that race had in fact been the predominant
motivation. Rather, it argued that the Court had misapplied the clearly erroneous standard.
Id. at 259 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
80. Id-at 241-43 (opinion of the Court).
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provides for a fair, geographic, racial and partisan balance
throughout the State of North Carolina. I think in order to come
to an agreement all sides had to give a little bit, but I think
we've reached an agreement that we can live with."'
The Supreme Court held that Senator Cooper's reference to the
"racial balance" of the plan-its preservation of the 10-to-2
black/white balance in the State's twelve-member congressional
delegation-showed "that the legislature considered race, along
with other partisan and geographic considerations," but concluded
that this "says little or nothing about whether race played a
predominantrole comparatively speaking." 2
That the legislature "considered" race is, of course, not precisely
the same thing as saying that the legislature was "aware" of race.
The former at least suggests some level of volition as to the
consequences of its decision, whereas the latter need not. Put in
Feeney terms, it seems quite clear that the Supreme Court is
prepared to conclude that North Carolina selected the challenged
plan "at least in part because of,' not merely 'in spite of,'" the racial
composition of the districts. Yet the Court did not apply strict
scrutiny. When race was just one factor among many, the Court
seemed prepared, at least this time, to let race play a role in the
process. The desire to assure some representation for the state's
substantial black population did not strike the Court as the kind of
motive that should strip the state's decisions of their presumption
of constitutionality.
B. What Counts As a Compelling Justification
The Supreme Court's discussions of what constitutes a
compelling state interest justifying the use of race in the
redistricting process may also mark a promising turn in equal
protection doctrine. In suggesting that compliance with sections 2
and 5 of the Voting Rights Act can constitute a compelling state
interest,8 3 the Court has raised the possibility that congressional or
executive understandings of equality that go beyond what the
81. Id. at 253.
82. Id.
83. E.g., Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 915 (1996).
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Constitution itself requires can provide a justification for raceconscious state action.
Only the purposeful dilution of minority voting strength violates
the Constitution. 4 The Voting Rights Act, however, prohibits state
and local governments from using electoral arrangements that
have a discriminatory impact regardless of the government's
motivation. 5 Section 2 forbids using an arrangement that "results
in a denial or abridgement of the right.., to vote"; a violation occurs
if minority voters "have less opportunity than other members
of the electorate to participate in the political process and to
elect representatives of their choice."86 Section 5 applies only to
a statutorily defined subset of jurisdictions.8 7 These "covered
84. Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 520 U.S. 471, 481 (1997) (citing City of Mobile v.
Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 62 (1980)). Ironically, no proof of discriminatory purpose is required for
the quantitative claim of dilution through malapportionment. See James U. Blacksher &
Larry T. Menefee, From Reynolds v. Sims to City of Mobile v. Bolden: Have the White
SuburbsCommandeeredthe FifleenthAmendment?, 34 HASTINGSL.J. 1,4,19 (1982) (noting
that claims of one person, one vote are easier to bring than claims of racial discrimination
against black voters).
85. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 35 (1986) (discussing section 2 of the Voting
Rights Act as amended). A particularly striking illustration comes from another provision
of the Act: the ban on literacy tests. 42 U.S.C. § 1973aa (1994). In Oregon v. Mitchell, 400
U.S. 112 (1970), the Court unanimously held that the 1970 amendment to the Voting Rights
Act that banned literacy tests nationwide was an appropriate use of congressional
enforcement power under the Fifteenth Amendment. Arizona had challenged that provision
on the ground that its literacy test was administered in a nondiscriminatry manner. The
case produced five separate opinions, because the Justices fractured on an unrelated
provision of the Act dealing with guaranteeing eighteen-year-olds the right to vote. Justice
Brennan's opinion for himself and two other Justices declared that "Congress could
legitimately have concluded that the use of literacy tests anywhere within the United States
has the inevitable effect of denying the vote to members of racial minorities whose inability
to pass such tests is the direct consequence of previous governmental discrimination in
education." Id. at 235. Justice Brennan concluded that "Congressional power to remedy the
evils resulting from state-sponsored racial discrimination does not end when the subject of
that discrimination removes himself from the jurisdiction in which the injury occurred." Id.
at 233. Similarly, in Gaston County v. United States, 395 U.S. 285 (1969), the Court upheld
the suspension of that county's literacy test without any showing that the test was
implemented in a racially discriminatory manner. In part, that decision rested on the fact
that the county's previous maintenance of a de jure segregated school system had provided
its black citizens with an inferior education that "in turn deprived them of an equal chance
to pass the literacy test." Id. at 291. The Court, however, found "no legal significance" to the
county's claim that some residents' inability to pass the test was a result of their having
received their education "in other counties or States also maintaining segregated and
unequal school systems," rather than in Gaston County itself. Id. at 293 n.9.
86. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1994) (emphasis added).
87. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(b) (1994) (setting out the formula); 28 C.F.R. pt. 51 app. (2001)
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jurisdictions" cannot make any changes in their district lines until
the new lines have been precleared by either the Department of
Justice or the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.
Preclearance is conditioned on the jurisdiction's proving that the
new plan will not have a "discriminatory effect.""8 For purposes of
section 5, effect is defined in comparative terms: the proposed plan
is compared to the existing plan, and the reviewing authority asks
whether the plan will have a "retrogressive" effect on minority
voting strength by making minority voters worse off. 9 Thus, both
the results test of section 2 and the retrogressive effects test of
section 5 go beyond what the Constitution itself would reach.
"The essence of a § 2 claim is that a certain electoral law,
practice, or structure interacts with social and historical conditions
to cause an inequality in the opportunities enjoyed by black and
white voters to elect their preferred representatives."90 Section 2
claims involve an indivisible blend of state action and private
choice. 9 The pure state action is the drawing of district lines. The
private action involves individual voters choosing which candidates
to support. The mechanism that produces inequality is racial bloc
voting-the decision by white voters and minority voters to support
competing candidates. If racial bloc voting occurs, then the whitepreferred candidate will win in any jurisdiction where whites are a
numerical majority of the electorate.

(listing the actual jurisdictions). Basically the formula looks at two factors: whether, on one
of three specified dates, a jurisdiction conditioned the right to vote by imposing a literacy
"test or device" (which includes use of English language-only voting materials in a
jurisdiction with large numbers of non-English speakers); and whether, on that date, either
less than fifty percent ofthe persons of voting age were registered to vote or less than fifty
percent of such persons voted in the presidential election.
88. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1994) (emphasis added).
89. Section 5 also forbids adopting a new plan with a retrogressive purpose, regardless
of its effect. Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 528 U.S. 320 (2000). That standard, however,
not only does not go beyond what the Constitution itself forbids, it actually requires
preclearance of some purposefully discriminatory plans that would violate the Constitution.
For a comprehensive treatment of section 5, see THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY, supra note 20, at
546-671.
90. Thornburg,478 U.S. at 47.
91. Cf Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399, 403 (1964) (stating, in the context of a
Louisiana statute whose foreseeable purpose would be to encourage racial bloc voting, that
"[tihe crucial factor is the interplay of governmental and private action") (quoting NAACP
v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 463 (1958)).
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The relationship between state action and private choice in the
electoral arena, however, is extremely tangled. Although any
particular episode of racial bloc voting involves individual decision
making, the distinctive preferences of white and minorityvoters are
not entirely independent of state action. To the extent that racially
correlated differences in political preferences are the product of
socioeconomic disparities produced by inferior access to schools,
government services, and the like, state action has caused polarized
voting. Even more directly, past purposeful state discrimination in
the election process itself-Anderson v. Martin9 2 being a
particularly clear example- is likely to have affected white voters'
attitudes by communicating to them the idea that minority voters'
attempts to gain political power should be resisted.9"
In contrast to its powers with respect to employers or places of
public accommodation, the government cannot regulate individual
voters' choices to eradicate either overt racial bias or racially
correlated preferences. So the Voting Rights Act neutralizes the
consequences of bloc voting by changing the aspect of voting that is
within the government's control, namely, the boundaries of
electoral districts.9 4 It requires states to draw plans that enable
geographically concentrated, politically cohesive minority communities to elect representatives of their choice even in the face of
continued white bloc voting. Such plans do not occur by accident;
they require paying attention to race in the redistricting process.
Although the Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of
the retrogressive effects test of section 5," the Court has never
92. 375 U.S. 399 (1964). I discuss the case in the introduction to this Article, supra text
accompanying notes 3-7.
93. That this sort of intentional discrimination is not ancient history is shown by the
post-1980 round ofredistricting, in which influential legislators made such statements as "I
don't want to draw nigger districts" (comment made by state Rep. Joe Mack Wilson,
Chairman of the Georgia House Permanent Standing Committee on Legislative and
Congressional Reapportionment, explainingthe decision not to draw a majority-black district
centered on Atlanta) and "We already have a nigger mayor andwe don't need another nigger
bigshot" (comment by state Rep. Charles Emile Bruneau, member of the joint conference
committee responsible for drawing Louisiana's congressional districts, explaining why he
opposed creating a majority-black district centered on New Orleans). THE LAW OF
DEMOCRACY, supranote 20, at 653, 941 (reprinting these statements).
94. T. Alexander Aleinikoff & Samuel Issacharoff, Race and Redistricting: Drawing
ConstitutionalLines After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV. 588, 634 (1993).

95. City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 173-78 (1980).
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squarely ruled on the constitutionality of the results test of section
2. Nonetheless, in Bush v. Vera,9 6 five Justices indicated both that
states should be permitted "to assume the constitutionality of § 2 of
the VRA, including the 1982 amendments" that introduced the
results test,97 and that "the States have a compelling interest in
98
complying with the results test as this Court has interpreted it."
In part to avoid placing states in an impossible straitjacket, the
Court held that "deference is due to [states'] reasonable fears of,
and to their reasonable efforts to avoid, § 2 liability."99
I do not want to rehash the entire question of the continued
constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act here. °0 For present
purposes, it is enough simply to sketch out three theories under
which an effects test might reflect an appropriate use of Congress's
enforcement powers. First, under an "internal" theory, the Act
might be intended to get at purposeful discrimination within the
electoral system itself. Congress might conclude that the risk that
dilutive plans are in fact motivated by racially discriminatory
purposes is sufficiently great to forbid all dilution as a prophylactic
matter. Second, under an "external" theory, Congress might impose
an effects test to respond to prior illegal discrimination outside the
electoral process that either produces contemporary racial bloc
voting or otherwise reduces minority political strength. Finally,
under a prospective theory, Congress might decide that equal access
to the political process can prevent future unconstitutional
96. 517 U.S. 952 (1996).
97. Id. at 992 (O'Connor, J., concurring). The opinions in Vera are somewhat tangled.
Justice O'Connor announced the judgment of the Court, striking down the three challenged
Texas districts, and also wrote an opinion for herself, the Chief Justice, and Justice Kennedy
that explicitly left these issues open. She then wrote a concurring opinion that effectively
resolved the issues because she adopted a position that created a five-Justice bloc given the
dissenters' position. The four consistent dissenters to the entire Shaw enterprise-initially
Justices White, Blackmun, Stevens, and Souter, andnow Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg,
and Breyer-have never questioned the constitutionality of amended section 2 and have
consistently argued that compliance with sections 2 and 5 is a compelling state interest. See,
e.g., id. at 1033 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 1065 (Souter, J., dissenting).
98. Id. at 992 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
99. Id. at 978 (opinion of O'Connor, J.).
100. For an extensive discussion of this issue, see THELAWOF DEMOCRACY, supranote 20,
at 859-66; Heather K. Gerken, Understandingthe Right to an UndilutedVote, 114 HARV. L.
REV. 1663, 1737 (2001); Pamela S. Karlan, Two Section Twos and Two SectionFives: Voting
Rights and Remedies After Flores, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 725 (1998); Douglas Laycock,
Conceptual Gulfs in City of Boerne v. Flores, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 743, 749-52 (1998).
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discrimination by making legislative bodies more responsive to
issues important to the minority community. As the Court
recognized in Katzenbach v. Morgan,1 "enhanced political power
will be helpful in gaining nondiscriminatory treatment" in "the
provision or administration of governmental services, such as public
schools, public housing and law enforcement." l 2 Regulation of the
political process represents a decision to combat the risk of
unconstitutional discrimination on the wholesale level, by providing
all citizens with an equal opportunity to participate effectively in
the political process, rather than leaving all enforcement to the
retail level by enacting laws that impose equal treatment
obligations in discrete areas of state government activity such as
schools, public employment, or housing. °3
In Bush v. Vera, 4 the Court concluded that compliance with the
Voting Rights Act required Texas to take race into account in its
congressional redistricting. The State had a strong basis in evidence
for concluding that section 2 required it to draw a plurality-black,
majority-minority district in Dallas.0 5 Moreover, because Harris
County "had, for two decades, contained a congressional district
in which African-American voters had succeeded in selecting
representatives of their choice, all of whom were AfricanAmericans," the nonretrogression principle of section 5 "mandate [d]
that the minority's opportunityto elect representatives of its choice
not be diminished, directly or indirectly, by the State's actions."'
Where the plan at issue in Vera ran afoul of the Constitution was
in its failure to engage in narrow tailoring: The district the State
actually drew in Dallas deviated too greatly from the kind of district
section 2 might have required, because the actual district was not
reasonably compact, and the district the state drew in Harris
County went beyond "maintenance" of black voting strength
because it significantly increased the percentage of black voters
within the district.

101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

384 U.S. 641 (1966).
Id. at 652.
Karlan, supranote 100, at 740.
517 U.S. 952 (1996).
Id. at 994-95 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Id. at 982-83 (opinion of O'Connor, J.).
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Two lower courts, however, have held that challenged districts
survived strict scrutiny because the Voting Rights Act arguably
required the creation of some majority-minority districts and the
challenged districts were narrowly tailored given the political
context in which they were drawn. In King v. State Board of
Elections,"°7 the district court concluded that "racial considerations
predominated over all other factors in the configuration of the
[majority-Hispanic] Fourth Congressional District," thereby
triggering strict scrutiny." 8 Ultimately, the court concluded that
the district was narrowly tailored to serve the State's compelling
interest in complying with section 2. First, the State had a strong
basis in evidence for concluding that the creation of a majorityHispanic district was required, in light of the size and location of
the Hispanic population and the prevalence of racial bloc voting
within Chicago. 1"9 Second, the irregularities in the district's
shape-it connected two geographically separated Hispanic
communities by means of a long, narrow corridor-served to
preserve the configurations of three already existent majority-black
districts and "[in the absence of evidence that those districts are
unconstitutionally drawn, the preservation of existing districts was
a valid secondary consideration."" 0
In the other case-the lower court consideration of Easley v.
Cromartie' itself-the three-judge district court had upheld the
state's creation of the majority-black First Congressional District.
As it had with respect to the Twelfth District-the district
ultimately approved by the Supreme Court-the district court found2
that race "predominated" in the construction of the First District."
Nevertheless, the district court held that "there was a strong basis
for the General Assembly to have believed" that the elements of a
section 2 claim existed given a large, geographically compact,
politically cohesive black community "in the area encompassed by
107. 979 F. Supp. 582 (N.D. Ill.
1996) (three-judge court) (King 1), vacated and remanded
in light of Bush v. Vera, 519 U.S. 978 (1996).
108. Id. at 605.
109. King v. State Bd. of Elections, 979 F. Supp. 619, 624-27 (N.D. Ill.
1997) (three-judge
court) (KingI), summarily affd, 522 U.S. 1087 (1998).
110. Id. at 625 n.4.
111. 532 U.S. 234 (2001).
112. The district court's decision is unreported. An excerpted version is reprinted in THE
LAW OF DEMOCRACY, supra note 20, at 942-45.
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District 1" and the degree of racial bloc voting. It also found that the
district was narrowly tailored, despite some "juttingirregularities,"
because "the splitting of counties and the lack of compactness
display the interplay" between the need to comply with section 2
and the desire to protect both the incumbent in the previous version
of the First
District and an incumbent in the adjacent Third
3
District.1

With its decision in Cromartie,the Supreme Court signed off on
the post-1990 round of redistricting litigation just in time for the
next round."' The guidance it has given to state and local
governments is reminiscent of nothing so much as Yogi Berra's
famous suggestion that "when you come to a fork in the road, take
it."" 5 States must continue to take race into account to avoid
dilution under the Voting Rights Act, but they cannot
overemphasize it. Given that the Court remains sharply divided,
that it continues to have mandatory appellate jurisdiction over
challenges to state legislative and congressional plans," 6 that it
seems to have committed itself to conducting serious factual review,
and that Shaw cases will remain a stalking horse for various
partisan interests, the deluge of cases is likely to continue.
The Voting Rights Act and its aspiration of creating truly
representative legislative bodies has survived nearly a decade's
worth of searching judicial review. In the process, the Court has
been forced to confront the consequences that expansive resort to
strict scrutiny might produce, and it has blinked. First, the Court
has significantly tightened the trigger for strict scrutiny: under
Adarand, all racial classifications must be analyzed under strict
scrutiny, but under Shaw and its progeny, only when race
predominates and subordinates race-neutral considerations does it
prompt heightened scrutiny. Second, it has recognized that
compliance with federal law can constitute a compelling state
interest for takingrace into account even when the federal law goes
113. The plaintiffs did not appeal the district court's holding with respect to the First
District.
114. The first judicial decision reviewing a post-2000 plan was handed down less than
three weeks after Cromartie.See Page v. Bartels, 144 F. Supp. 2d 346 (D.N.J. 2001) (threejudge court) (upholding a state legislative redistricting).
115. BARTLEx'S FAMIuAR QUOTATIONS 754, 15 (Justin Kaplan ed., 16th ed. 1992).
116. See supranote 20.
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beyond what the Constitution itself requires. It has permitted
states to take race into account to prevent their election systems
from having a disparate impact on minority voters. In short, the
Court has been unwilling to use strict scrutiny to dismantle the
crown jewel of the Second Reconstruction. Faced with the prospect
of a wholesale ouster of minority representatives from federal and
state legislative bodies, the Court has created a more forbearant
version of strict scrutiny. The question is whether that version has
legs beyond redistricting.

II. FROM LEGISLATIVE BODIES TO STUDENT BODIES: CAN THE
REDISTRICTING DECISIONS SHED LIGHT ON AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
IN HIGHER EDUCATION?
Despite several recent invitations,1 1 the Supreme Court has not
returned to the question of affirmative action in higher education
since its 1978 decision in Regents of the University of Californiav.
Bakke.'18 There has been a lot of water under the bridge since then,
including the Court's categorical imposition of strict scrutiny in
1 19 But with the redistricting cases,
Adarand.
there has now been so
much water under the proverbial bridge that perhaps a different
channel has been carved. In this part, I suggest reasons to think
that affirmative action in the higher education admissions process
resembles redistricting-therefore calling for a softer form of
scrutiny-more than it resembles the competitive bidding process
at issue in cases like Croson and Adarand.
A. What Triggers Strict Scrutiny?
Redistricting and admissions to competitive educational
institutions share a set of characteristics that suggests that race
plays a complicated role in each. To understand why, let us begin
117. E.g., Texas v. Hopwood, 121 S. Ct. 2550 (2001); Smith v. University of Wash. Law
Sch., 532 U.S. 1051 (2001); Texas v. Hopwood, 518 U.S. 1033 (1996). The Fifth and Ninth
Circuits each noted their explicit disagreement with one another. Hopwood v. Texas, 236
F.3d 256, 275 n.66 (5th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. at 2550; Smith v. University of
Wash. Law Sch., 233 F.3d 1188, 1200 n.9 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. at 1051.
118. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
119. 515 U.S. 200 (1995). Among other things, Adarand cast doubt on the Court's earlier
embrace of a diversity rationale in Metro Broadcasting,Inc. v. FCC,497 U.S. 547 (1990).
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by considering the nature of the decision process absent the use of
race. Both redistricting and admissions to a state's flagship
educational institutions 2 ° still would demand looking at more than
numbers, and for similar sorts of reasons.
One person, one vote is a nice, easy-to-quantify starting point for
drawing districts, but there are a huge number of equally compliant
plans that will produce dramatically different legislative bodies. It
would be possible to choose among equipopulous plans at random..l
But not all equipopulous plans will make sense on the ground: some
plans will split real communities, unite dissimilar groups, ignore
physical and political boundaries, place incumbents in unfamiliar
districts, or produce very disproportionate partisan balance. Some
plans will simply produce legislative bodies that are more
"representative" than others. Thus, even most proponents of
computer-driven apolitical redistricting processes would require
including other variables in the formula, such as geographic
compactness, respect for subdivision boundaries, and respect for
community lines. In the real world, where redistricting remains a
fiercely political process, even monoracial communities consider
such additional factors as partisan advantage and balance, and
protection ofincumbents. In any event, slavish pursuit ofmaximum
population equality involves a spurious faith in statistics-the
census figures are themselves essentially a static estimate of a
constantly changing reality and no one seriously believes that
individuals in districts with over a half million people in them
suffer any real injury if the districts differ by a few hundred
residents.'22
120. Most of the real battle over affirmative action concerns the admission to a relatively
small number ofprofessional schools and elite undergraduate institutions, since most other
institutions are not sufficiently selective in the first place.
121. For discussions of the various proposals and scholarship regarding random
districting, see Samuel Issacharoff, JudgingPolitics:The Elusive Quest for JudicialReview
of PoliticalFairness,71 TEX. L. REV. 1643, 1696-1703 (1993), and Daniel H. Lowenstein &
Jonathan Steinberg, The Quest for LegislativeDistrictingin the Public Interest: Elusive or
Illusory?, 33 UCLA L. REV. 1, 61-63 (1985) (discussing the way this could be accomplished
but opposing the idea). See also Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 1057, 1070-72, 1077 (1996)
(Souter, J., dissenting) (suggesting that random districting might be the only way to make
Shaw manageable).
122. See Karlan,supra note 64, at 735-36. The Supreme Court held to the contrary in
Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725 (1983), where it struck, down New Jersey's post-1980
congressional redistricting on grounds of one person, one vote, when the difference in
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There are both pluralist and republican reasons for having a
multidimensional redistricting process. 2 ' The pluralist reasons
focus on the fair representation of distinct interests within the
legislative process. As Justice Harlan trenchantly observed, "people
are not ciphers." 124 Thus, "legislators can represent their electors
only by speaking for their interests-economic, social, [and]
political."1 25 A redistricting process that does not consider those
interests in deciding where to draw lines risks failing to enable
their representation within the legislature. The republican reasons
focus on enhancing the quality of legislative deliberation: a more
widely representative legislative body is more likely to contain the
various perspectives that can contribute to wise policymaking.
Similarly, in higher education, elite institutions could rely
entirely on a few raw or mechanically adjusted numbers. Indeed,
virtually everywhere such numbers form a starting point in the
admissions process and are used to separate those who are capable
of benefitting from and contributing to the school's educational
programs from those who are not (or who are markedly less likely
to be). At most elite institutions, however, it would be possible to
produce entering classes with vastly different characteristics, each
made up entirely of well-qualified students. The numbers
themselves, even when adjusted, may offer a spurious precision
with respect to particular applicants. A school, like a legislature,
may decide that a variety of other factors beyond standardized
test scores and grade point averages will enhance its various
missions. In that regard, it might decide, even in the complete
absence of racial considerations, to take into account factors such
as geographic diversity, choice of specialization, distinctive extracurricular experiences, nonquantifiable evidence that an applicant's
future promise is not adequately signaled by her past performance,
and the like. Moreover, along the same vaguely venal lines as
incumbent protection and partisanship, a school may decide to
population between the largest and smallest districts-the former had 527,472 residents
while the latter had 523,798, a deviation of roughly six-tenths of one percent-was
infinitesimal. The Karcherdecision clearly was informed by the fact that the minimal but
avoidable population deviations were in service of a naked political gerrymander.
123. For a more extensive discussion ofthis point see Pamela S. Karlan, Our Separatism?
Voting Rights as an American NationalitiesPolicy, 1995 U. CHI.LEGAL F. 83, 96-99.
124. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 623 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
125. Id. at 623-24.
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grant preferences to children of alumni or other financial or
political supporters.
The reasons for going beyond the numbers are both "pluralist"
and "republican." Within the institution, using multidimensional
admissions criteria may be important for programmatic purposes:
faculty in diverse disciplines need students to teach; the quality of
discussion and the learning experience will be enhanced by
students and faculty being exposed to a variety of viewpoints which
may be correlated with different admissions criteria; and there may
be a variety of co- and extracurricular activities that depend on
there being students with different interests and talents. In the
broader world, the institution's continued vitality may depend on
there being broad political support for its mission. Such support
may be enhanced in a diverse jurisdiction by providing access to
students from different constituencies.12 Finally, to the extent that
public higher education aims to produce social, economic, and
political leaders in a complex and diverse society, admissions
officers might conclude that factors other than quantifiable
academic performance are relevant. For instance, an applicant with
exceptional artistic talent who did poorly in high school science
classes, or a student with a demonstrated commitment to public
interest law practice whose college transcript is marred by his
terrible performance during his freshman year might be a more
desirable applicant than someone with even a significantly better
index number.
Now introduce race into the mix: In redistricting, courts have
expressed a skepticism about strong race essentialism,127 but they
have also recognized that race may in fact be highly correlated with
political affiliation, 2 ' and with the presence of distinct, somehow
organic "communities." When this is so, pluralist politics may
126. The question of the political imperatives behind flagship institution admissions is
discussed in Samuel Issacharoff, Bakke in the Admissions Office and the Courts: Can
Affirmative Action Be Defended?, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 669 (1998).
127. Millerv. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900,911-12 (1995) ("When the State assigns voters on the
basis of race, it engages in the offensive and demeaning assumption that voters of a
particular race, because of their race, think alike, share the same political interests, and will
prefer the same candidates at the polls.") (internal quotation marks omitted).
128. See Easleyv. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234,242 (2001). Proofofdistinctive race-correlated,
if not necessarily racially caused, differences in preference among candidates is the sine qua
non of any section 2 vote dilution case.
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suggest-and the Voting Rights Act may even require-taking race
into account and drawing majority-nonwhite districts. The
redistricting decisions recognize that awareness of race cannot be
removed entirely from the process; as long as race does not
subordinate other considerations, taking it into account does not
trigger strict scrutiny.
It is possible to see Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke as taking a
similar tack. That opinion expresses a similar ambivalence about
race: there is something disquieting and perhaps offensive about
assuming that an applicant's race says something relevant about
her views or, perhaps, even her experiences. At the same time,
racial diversity and a desegregated educational environment are
likely to change the educational process in a salutary direction.
In a multidimensional admissions process, race is a factor, but it
does not subordinate such apparently traditional, race-neutral
criteria12 9 as prior academic achievement and promise, and the
admission of a well-rounded class. On the other hand, in a more
rigid admissions process, race appears to predominate. The
difference between the two maps onto the distinction the Court has
recently made in the redistricting process. If not all awareness and
use of race triggers strict scrutiny in the redistricting process, then
why should it do so in the admissions process?
B. What Counts as a CompellingInterest?
The redistricting cases also suggest a potentially fruitful new line
of argument with regard to the compelling state interest inquiry. If
a reasonable attempt to comply with a federally mandated effects
test can serve as an appropriate justification for race consciousness
129. I use the term "apparently," because it is not entirely clear that many of the
contemporary criteria are traditional-the era of their imposition being roughly
contemporaneous with the dramatic expansion in the pool of applicants for higher
education--or that the criteria are always race-neutral in both purpose and effect. For
example, preference for alumni children perpetuates past de jure discrimination to the extent
that it benefits descendants of individuals who attended the school at a time when minority
applicants were excluded.
My colleague Rick Banks has written a thoughtful and extensive discussion of the
relationship among admissions criteria, understandings of merit, racial exclusion, and the
distribution and production ofsocial value. R. Richard Banks,MeritocraticValues and Racial
Outcomes: Defending Class-BasedCollege Admissions, 79 N.C. L. REV. 1029 (2001).
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in the districting process, then perhaps it can do so in the
admissions process as well.
So-called section 602 regulations provide one possible counterpart
to the Voting Rights Act. Virtually all public institutions of higher
education are subject to Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,1"'
which forbids racial discrimination in programs receiving federal
funds. Section 601, like the Constitution, forbids only intentional
discrimination.' Under section 602, however, which authorizes
federal agencies issuing rules or regulations "to effectuate the
provisions of [section 601], "132 at least forty federal agencies,
including the Department of Education, have adopted regulations
that prohibit practices that have a discriminatory effect. 3 ' The
Department ofEducation's regulations provide, among other things,
that recipients of federal funds cannot "utilize criteria or methods
of administration which have the effect of subjecting individuals" 1to
3 4
discrimination because of their race, color, or national origin,
and make clear that admissions practices are among the covered
actions.

Moreover, "[elven in the absence of ... prior discrim-

ination [by the particular institution or program], a recipient ...
may take affirmative action to overcome the effects of conditions
which resulted in limiting participation by persons of a particular
race, color, or national origin." "6 Thus, the Department of
Education's regulations, like sections 2 and 5 of the Voting Rights
Act, embody a results test.

130. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d to 2000d-6 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
131. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 280 (2001).
132. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
133. Unlike sections 2 and 5 of the Voting Rights Act, which have each been held to
provide an implied private right of action for aggrieved individuals, section 602-based
disparate impact regulations do not give rise to a private cause of action. SeeAlexander, 532
U.S. at 275. Nevertheless, they can be enforced through the cut-offoffederal funds and other
administrative enforcement.
In one important sense, section 5 resembles section 602. The private cause of action under
section 5 normally forces a jurisdiction into a federal administrative process to determine
whether the change has a discriminatory effect. See Allen v. State Bd. ofElections, 393 U.S.
544, 570 (1969). The substantive decision is not subject to judicial review. See Morris v.
Gressette, 432 U.S. 491 (1977).
134. 34 C.F.R. § 103.3(b)(2) (2001).
135. Id § 100.4(d)(1).
136. Id. § 100.3(b)(6)(ii).
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Ironically, section 602-based disparate impact regulations are
analogous to section 2 of the Voting Rights Act in another respect:
Although a number of the Court's decisions rest on an assumption
that the federal government can promulgate effects-based
regulations under section 602, the Court has never squarely held
that. Still, in Alexander v. Choate,' the Court declared that Title
VI has "delegated to the agencies in the first instance the complex
determination of what sorts of disparate impacts upon minorities
constitut[e] sufficiently significant social problems, and [are] readily
enough remediable, to warrant altering the practices of the federal
grantees that have produced those impacts,"'3 8 and at least five
Justices agreed in Guardians Association v. Civil Service
Commission"9 that regulations promulgated under section 602 may
proscribe activities that have a disparate impact on racial groups,
even though they are not forbidden by section 601.140 But, just as
states have a compelling interest in complying with the
presumptively constitutional Voting Rights Act, so too, educational
institutions should be permitted to assume that section 602
regulations represent a valid exercise of federal executive power. If
they do, then state institutions should have a compelling interest
in adhering to them.
An educational institution could reasonably fear being found in
violation of the Department of Education's regulations if it
implemented an admissions policy that resulted in the wholesale
exclusion of black or Hispanic applicants, particularly because it
might be difficult to show that such a policy pursued some other
valid goal. In order to avoid violating the regulations, some level of
race-consciousness might be necessary. Further, like section 2 of the
Voting Rights Act, the Department of Education's regulations do
not require proof of prior intentional, unconstitutional behavior
by the specific government entity in order to justify raceconscious affirmative action. In light of the federal government's
determination that full effectuation of the straightforward
137. 469 U.S. 287 (1985).
138. Id. at 293-94.
139. 463 U.S. 582 (1983).
140. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 282 (2001) (describing the lineup in
Guardians).Thus, Sandoval assumed the validity of such regulations in the context of a case
regarding whether a private right of action could be found.
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constitutional (and statutory) command to avoid purposeful racial
discrimination requires prohibiting state action that has a
discriminatory impact as well, compliance with these rules by
public educational institutions, like compliance by state
redistricting authorities, ought to be considered a compelling state
interest.
As in redistricting, the question of narrow tailoring is likely to be
the issue least amenable to broad statements of principle. It may
turn out that many affirmative action plans, like many legislative
districts, get struck down not because the institution was forbidden
from relying on race altogether, but because it relied too much, and
in too visible a way, on racial factors. As Alexander Aleinikoff and
Samuel Issacharoff observed at the very outset of the Shaw cases:
[The Shaw casesl inconclusive resolution of the ultimate issue
whether race may ever be justifiably relied upon in redistricting
reaffirms the messy jurisprudence of compromise that has
guided the center of the Court since [Bakke]. The heart of this
jurisprudence is a never quite satisfactory accommodation
between deeply individualistic notions of appropriate treatment
and a politically charged conception of the representational
legitimacy of principal institutions in our society.14 '
That ambivalence means that admissions, like reapportionment,
may turn out to be "one area in which appearances do matter."4 2 A
process that too greatly formalizes the role ofrace-by, for example,
setting different cutoff scores for white and minority applicants or
using separate admissions committees-may trouble the courts far
more than a process that produces an entering class with a similar
demographic composition through more apparently holistic
methods. At the same time, a process that produces a completely
monoracial class in a multiracial society will produce an opposite,
and perhaps equal, disquiet.
Finally, the essentially prospective nature of both the
redistricting and the admissions processes should shift the Court's
141. Aleinikoff& Issacharoff, supranote 94, at 592; see also Richard H. Pildes, Principled

Limitationson Racial and PartisanRedistricting, 106 YALE L.J. 2505, 2511 n.20 (1997).
142. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 647 (1993).

143. See Issacharoff, supranote 121.

1602

WILLIA.M AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43:1569

approach to the question of narrow tailoring. Redistricting and
admissions are periodic activities-once a decade, the authorities
redraw district boundaries; once a year, they choose a new entering
class. Thus, neither activity is amenable to a theory in which race
can be taken into account only to provide a remedy to identifiable
victims ofprior unconstitutional discrimination in the process itself.
Moreover, the present-day reality is that a truly race-blind process
in either arena is likely to produce a far more monochromatic result
than the current system, and the more quantitative the process, the
more monochromatic the result. The Court's implicitly preferred
alternative-to use some sort of race-neutral process to produce a
racially representative result-may be both incoherent and
inefficient. Redistricting is already formally race neutral in the
sense that the lines on the map contain no racial references at all
(unlike countries with explicitly racial representation systems).
What offended the Court was the appearance that racial
considerations nonetheless played too great a role. Similarly, using
even a formally race-neutral admissions standard, if the standard
were picked precisely because of the racial results it would produce,
may offend the Court if the intention is too blatant. In any event,
redistricting based on "communities of interest" or class-based
affirmative action would certainly be constructed differently if the
racial representativeness of the relevant institutions were not an
issue. It appears, therefore, that race will often play a role even in
facially neutral decisions.
CONCLUSION

Whether or not there is only one equal protection clause,' the
redistricting cases suggest there is definitely more than one kind of
strict scrutiny. Faced with the prospect of applying a form of strict
scrutiny that threatened to resegregate state legislatures and
congressional delegations, the Supreme Court has been unwilling
144. Cf Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 246 (1995) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (reiterating the claim that "there is ... only one Equal Protection Clause" rather
than a series of discrete tests to be applied based on the kind of governmental classification
at issue); see also Daniel R. Ortiz, The Myth ofIntent in EqualProtection, 41 STAN. L. REV.
1105 (1989) (suggesting that the Supreme Court has defined discriminatory purpose
differently in such different contexts as schools, voting, and employment).
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to apply strict scrutiny strictly. It has constricted the domain in
which strict scrutiny comes into play, permitting race to be taken
into account when it is one factor among many and its inclusion
produces districts that do not deviate too obviously from the sorts
of districts created for other groups. It has also broadened the
interests that can justify race-conscious redistricting, by holding
that compliance with the Voting Rights Act's results tests can
serve as a compelling state interest. The understanding of political
equality embodied in the Act goes beyond what the Constitution
itself demands. It requires states to arrange their electoral
institutions to minimize the lingering effects of prior un145
constitutional discrimination not otherwise chargeable to them,
as well as to mitigate the impact of racially polarized voting that
involves otherwise constitutionally protected private choice. In
short, the theory of strict scrutiny yielded to the need for an
electoral system that is equally open to members of minority
groups. My hope is that when the Court confronts the role race
plays in admissions to elite educational institutions, it takes a
similar tack and permits those institutions to pursue equality and
provide equal opportunities to participate as well.

145. See supranote 85 (discussing how the Court upheld the nationwide ban on literacy
tests in part on the basis of the fact that some voters would be unable to pass even fairly
administered tests because they had received inferior educations during the era of de jure
segregation, even in other jurisdictions).

